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gious experience is epistemically of little or no value to the theist (apart
from the possibility of a good inductive argument, which Gale acknowledges he hasn't considered). However, it is at very least arguable that the
primary epistemic role that religious experience has to play for the theist is
not as the foundation of an argument for God's existence, but rather as a
ground for directly or immediately justified religious belief. On this view,
religious experience provides one with a non-inferential, non-propositional
reason for belief in God in much the same way that my experience of my
word processor provides me with a non-inferential, non-propositional reason to believe in its existence. It is worth noting that many epistemologists
have held that if my word processor belief (and my other physical world
beliefs) requires me to have a non-circular justificatory argument, I'm in
epistemic hot water. So Gale's construal of the epistemic role of religious
experience as primarily inferential is at odds with what the majority of current defenders of the value of such experience are arguing.
Despite this problem, I think that Gale's book is splendid. No one working in philosophical theology can afford not to take note of it. While some
of the argumentation will be over the heads of standard undergraduates, I
highly recommend it for use in graduate courses in philosophy of religion.

Docs God's Existence Need Proof?, by Richard Messer. Oxford: Clarendon
Press,1993. Pp.160. $29.95 (cloth).
ALAN PADGEIT, Azusa Pacific University
This is a helpful book that does a good job of laying out the issues in an
important area of philosophy of religion. It illustrates the difference that
deep disagreemnt over our basic approach to philosophy makes to theology and philosophy of religion. The book, however, is not really about
arguments for the existence of God, as the title might suggest. Instead, it
compares the differing approaches to philosophy in the work of to wellknown British scholars, D. Z. Phillips and Richard Swinburne. It concludes, in the light of such fundamental philosophical pluralism, that some
relativist position is the most reasonable view to adopt.
Chapter One looks at the problem of religious language. It begins by
discussing Swinburne's theory of religious language, and finds three principles (assumptions) at work in his philosophy: cognitivity, expressibility,
and rationality. He notes that religious language is literal and factual on
"most" occasions for Swinburne, and analogical on the others (6). The
existence of God is a purported fact which is either true or false, and which
claim we make can be assessed on the basis of evidence. Messer labels this
the "traditional" school. On the other hand, Phillips and the other
"devout" Wittgensteinians (Malcolm, Rhees, Winch), have a very different
conception of the meaning of religious language. For them, philosophy is
descriptive and "grammatical" rather than analytical or normative.
Much of this chapter covers old ground, but it is interesting reading.
Messer clearly favors the Wittgensteinian approach. "To think otherwise is
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to impose the misconceived cognitive principle upon religious language"
(13). Why is such a principle misconceived? Does Swinburne and his
school really "impose" it upon religious language, or are they simply explicating religious language philosophically? The author doesn't tell us. He
does misunderstand one point. Messer writes that "We have seen that
Swinburne advocates a survey of what believers take themselves to mean
by their religious language in order to find out what it does mean" (16). Of
course, this is just a caricature of Swinburne's careful philosophical analysis.
In his debate with Phillips, Swinburne did remark that his philosophical
analysis would agree with what almost all believers themselves took to be
the meaning of their sentences (as opposed to Phillips' analysis) - but that
is a very different point than the one Messer takes it to be (8). While Phillips
is given a careful analysis in this chapter, Swinburne is something of a
whipping boy for the Wittgensteinians. That there might be another way to
read Wittgenstein that would be more in keeping with the cognitivity of
religious language (e.g., V. Brummer, A. C. Thiselton) is something Messer
does not consider. That the Wittgensteinians might simply be deceived that one can read Wittgenstein carefully and still hold to the cognitivity and
expressibility of God-talk - seems outside the imagination of this author.
Phillips is an important philosopher whose work deserves more careful
analysis and discussion than it often receives. This book is welcome
because it takes Phillips seriously, and defends his views against a number
of mistaken criticisms (chapt. 3). On the other hand, the overall scholarship is uneven. Messer often misunderstands Swinburne, or else has not
read him very carefully. For example, he writes, "I am not aware of
Swinburne writing on the subject of relativity" (120) even though
Swinburne is quite explicit about differing criteria for rationality and
induction in Faith and Reason.
This may be a result of the author's lack of sympathy with analytic philosophy. Messer is a relativist, and he uses the disagreement between
Phillips and Swinburne as evidence in favor of relativism. He discusses
different types of relativism in Chapter Four. He distinguishes between
conceptual, preconceptual, epistemological, surface and depth relativism.
He does not seem to have read very much on this topic, as he writes: "I
shall now distinguish between relativism and relativity. I am not aware of
a clear distinction being made between these two in the literature" (78). It
turns out that "relativity" is simply the socio-historical fact of disagreement, or pluralism, while relativism is based upon incommensurability.
The difference and distinction between the fact of pluralism, and relativism, is a common one in the literature.
Messer assumes that incommensurability is true, rather than arguing
for it. To be fair, he does mount an argument, but it goes no farther than
the assertion of the "fact of relativity" (i.e., diversity of opinion, theory,
and criteria). He believes that Phillips, Swinburne, and their schools
"dispute the fact of relativity" (80). He often writes as if he has made
some new discovery in noting the deep differences between philosophers
and cultures in their conceptions of truth, beauty and goodness. But
don't we live in a postmodern age? Even new philosophy students are
aware of these things.
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Here Messer needs to attend to his own distinction. No modern
philosopher of any standing is going to dispute the fact of relativity, that is,
the socio-historical fact of disagreement about criteria for rationality, etc.
Of course both Swinburne, Phillips, and many other philosophers will dispute relativism, simply because they don't find such a view very compelling on its intellectual merits. Just because one rejects Enlightenment
rationalism does not mean that one should follow Messer into bed with
Rorty and Kaufman. Because he often fails to pay attention to the distinction between pluralism and relativism, Messer merely assumes relativism
to be true in this book, rather than arguing for such a position.
Messer does have an interesting, informative and clear discussion of the
works of Gordon Kaufman, Richard Rorty, and Joseph Runzo. These are
the sorts of thinkers Messer finds himself most in agreement and sympathy
with. On the assumption that relativism of some sort is true, Messer in his
final chapter (Six) returns to the proofs. What value can they possibly be,
since "the relativity which is germane to an acceptance of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the Proofs within the Western philosophical
tradition admits of no solution at all" (73). It turns out that they are important because their discussion leads to important issues in philosophy that is, they are pragmatically useful in teaching and learning philosophy.
Hardly a new idea, but there it is.
This is an interesting and clear book, whose main strength lies in its
analysis of and dialogue with Phillips, and of relativist philosophers
such as Rorty. I recommend it for bright undergraduates, and graduate
students, for whom it is (I suppose) written. Apart from numerous
errors of exposition concerning the thought of some theologians and
philosophers, the main disappointment with this volume is that the
author does not tackle the real issue. He does not discuss in any helpful
way the deep philosophical problems surrounding relativism and
incommensurability. I would have thought, for example, that instead of
spending space discussing Dilthey in his chapter on relativism, much
more important debates could have been canvassed. For example,
Gadamer and Ricoeur are clearly aware of the claims of incommensurability, but do not become relativists. Why? Their reply to Derrida is of
particular importance to Messer's thesis. Alasdair MacIntyre also has a
very significant reply to relativists, arguing on an historical basis that
incommensurability may only be the starting point for a longer dialogue
and learning process in which some persons learn "a second first language." All of this is to say that these issues are much more complicated
that Messer appears to think, and Messer does philosophy a disservice
by ducking them.
Students of philosophy interested in Wittgenstein and the philosophy of
religion, or in relativism and religion, should read this book carefully. In
particular, its explication of Phillips's philosophy is helpful, given the misconception of that work by various analytic philosophers. The flaws in
exposition, and the undefended relativism, will have to be endured by
patient readers.

